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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine spending tens of thousands of dollars on expert wit-
ness fees to prosecute a trademark infringement case.  Imagine 
spending tens of thousands more dollars developing the demonstra-
tive evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case—evidence 
that includes a consumer survey to be proffered as proof that the 
defendant’s infringement has created actual trademark confusion.  
Now imagine the judge rejecting the survey because it fails to 
identify the relevant universe of consumers.  Your case is sunk! 
Too often, litigants engage in such costly and time-consuming 
evidence generation that is of little or no value at trial.  Trademark
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 surveys are expensive,1 hence they should be constructed carefully 
with emphasis on identifying the relevant universe of consumers.2 
As with any survey, in order to be probative or dispositive, the 
proper class of respondents must be interviewed.3  Because the 
crux of any trademark infringement case is the infringing mark’s 
effect on the typical consumer, a survey is normally required to 
measure that effect.4  Consequently, failure to properly identify the 
relevant group or universe of consumers in a trademark survey can 
be fatal to the trademark holder’s case.5 
This Article explains the ways in which identification of the 
relevant universe of consumers is an integral part of a trademark 
holder’s infringement case.  Part I discusses the reasons for em-
ploying trademark surveys to establish trademark infringement.  
Part II examines the policies that underlie the prevention of con-
sumer confusion and develops the temporal relationship theory and 
the spatial relationship theory to explain when consumer confusion 
occurs.  Part III analyzes various types of consumers to identify 
their roles in the relevant universe of consumers in various situa-
tions.  Part IV analyzes cases in which the court has determined the 
 
1. See Trademarks:  Protection of Merchandising Properties in Professional Sports, 
21 DUQ. L. REV. 927, 961 (1983) (reporting that preparation of a consumer survey pre-
sented in a trademark case cost in excess of $500,000). 
2. See Helene D. Jaffe, Avoiding the Pitfalls:  Use of Consumer Surveys in Lanham 
Act Cases, 8 SUM. ANTITRUST 30, 32 (1994) (stating that the first step in conducting a 
survey is to define the universe of consumers who actually purchase or use the products 
in question); see also Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Utah Div. of 
Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1997) (noting that purchasers of defendant’s 
products ought to be the appropriate universe for a survey). 
3. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976) 
(finding that in a survey applied to light bulbs, flashlights, and batteries, the universe 
consisted of the general population); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513 
(10th Cir. 1987) (finding that in a survey applied to fishing reels, the universe consisted 
of persons over 14 years of age who had fished in fresh water in the previous 12 months); 
Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc. 741 F.2d 925 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that in a 
survey applied to airplane parts, the universe consisted of all owners of private airplanes, 
regardless of whether they did their own repair work). 
4. See Larry C. Jones, Developing and Using Survey Evidence in Trademark Litiga-
tion, 19 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 479-80 (1989). 
5. See, e.g., Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 264 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980) (according no value to consumer survey results because 
the survey failed to test the proper universe of consumers). 
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evidentiary effect of a survey based on an improper universe.  This 
Article concludes that failure to identify the proper universe can be 
fatal to a survey proponent’s case. 
I. TRADEMARK SURVEYS ARE USED TO ESTABLISH TRADEMARK 
INFRINGEMENT 
A trademark is a powerful commercial tool that assures con-
sumers they will get exactly what they want.6  A trademark also 
identifies a particular product and associates that product with a 
particular source or manufacturer.7  Consequently, in the market 
context, a trademark can shorten shopping time because a con-
sumer can recognize the desired product by mark alone, rather than 
by examination of the entire label and packaging.8 
Such reduction in shopping time can occur only when the mark 
maintains a grip on the consumer’s mind.9  Corporations spend 
millions of dollars on advertising to implant specific product or 
service characteristics within the minds of target customers.10  
Trademark law seeks to protect this intangible asset, which is car-
ried around in the minds of consumers. 
 
6. See Shashank Upadhye, Rewriting the Lanham Trademark Act to Prohibit the 
Importation of All Gray Market Goods, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 59, 84 n.156 (1996).  
Often times, however, consumers do not get exactly what they want because even identi-
cally trademarked goods are of inferior quality.  See id. 
7. See Keds Corp. v. Renee Int’l Trading Corp., 888 F.2d 215, 218 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(stating that because a trademark owner spends time, money, and energy in presenting its 
product to the public, the owner’s investment should be protected from misappropriations 
by pirates and cheats). 
8. See William Landes & Richard Posner, Trademark Law:  An Economic Perspec-
tive, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987).  Landes and Posner provide examples of this phe-
nomenon.  Id. at 268-70.  According to Landes and Posner, allowing another decaffein-
ated coffee manufacturer to use the name “Sanka” would destroy any benefit in having an 
identifying brand name.  Id. at 269.  If consumers have a positive experience with a par-
ticular brand, it is more efficient for them to simply purchase the product by its trade-
mark.  See id. at 269. 
9. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §§ 2:5, 3:6 (4th ed. 1996); Door Sys., Inc. v. Pro-Line Door Sys., Inc., 83 
F.3d 169, 170 (7th Cir. 1996). 
10. See Golden Bear Int’l v. Bear USA, 969 F. Supp. 742, 744 (N.D. Ga. 1996) 
(stating that trademark holder spent over thirty five million dollars advertising the cloth-
ing). 
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Knowing that a trademark can maintain such a grip on the 
minds of consumers, a marketer often mimics a trademark or trade 
dress11 in order to obtain a free ride on the reputation of the pri-
mary mark holder.  This is often referred to as trading off the 
goodwill of others.12  A mere similarity between two trademarks, 
however, does not mean that there is trademark infringement.13  
Rather, to establish trademark infringement, the trademarks must 
be confusingly similar to the relevant public, that is, in the minds 
of the relevant consumers.14 
The analytical construct for trademark infringement necessarily 
examines the mark in question; it must be distinctive in order to re-
ceive protection.  The trademark holder can sue for infringement 
only if the mark is distinctive.15  Distinctiveness can be either in-
herent or acquired.  Coined,16 fanciful,17 arbitrary,18 or suggestive 
 
11. Trade dress generally refers to the products packaging, labeling, or containeriza-
tion.  See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992); Jamison Dean 
Newberg, The Same Old Enchilada? The Supreme Court Simplifies the Protection of In-
herently Distinctive Trade Dress in Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, 13 REV. LITIG. 299 
(1994). 
12. Trademark law is premised on the idea that when a party has expended re-
sources to develop an identification for its product, it is not equitable to allow another to 
trade on that party’s goodwill and reputation to promote his own goods or services.  See 
Tara J. Goldsmith, Note, What’s Wrong with this Picture? When the Lanham Act Clashes 
with Artistic Expression, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 821, 829 (1997). 
13. See Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that oth-
ers can produce designs similar to the trademark as long as there is no likelihood of con-
sumer confusion). 
14. See Continental Motors Corp. v. Continental Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857, 861 
(5th Cir. 1967) (“Confusion, or the likelihood of confusion . . . is the real test of trade-
mark infringement.”); MCCARTHY, supra note 9, § 23:1. 
15. See Weight Watchers Int’l v. Stouffer Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1321, 1328-29 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
16. A coined mark is an artificial word that has no language meaning except as the 
mark.  See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 
1976).  For example, “KODAK” has no language equivalent and is a purely invented 
word.  See Big O Tire Dealers v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 408 F. Supp. 1219, 1242-43 
(D. Col. 1976), aff’d, 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977). 
17. A fanciful mark is an invented word also but has some relationship to another 
word.  See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9.  For example, “FAB” is shortened for fabulous 
but “FAB” in and of itself has no language meaning.  See Big O Tire Dealers, 408 F. 
Supp. at 1242-43. 
18. An arbitrary word has a real language counterpart but does not describe or sug-
gest the underlying product by use of the word.  See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9.  For ex-
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marks19 are inherently distinctive.  On the other hand, descriptive 
marks are not inherently distinctive and thus, to receive protection, 
such marks must acquire secondary meaning.20  Generic marks are 
never entitled to protection, as they are purely descriptive of the 
products.21  Once a mark is deemed protectable, the mark holder 
may avail himself of the trademark infringement laws. 
A. Consumer Surveys and the Test for Likelihood of Confusion 
Traditional trademark infringement analysis begins with the 
likelihood of confusion test.22  The elements of the test vary among 
 
ample, “APPLE” is a mark for computers in addition to having an everyday language 
counterpart, namely the fruit. 
19. A suggestive mark is a word that suggests what the product is without actually 
describing it.  See id.  For example, “STRONGHOLD” suggests that the underlying 
product holds something together strongly but does not describe whether the product is a 
nail, screw, adhesive, glue, Velcro, or a bolt.  See Big O Tire Dealers, 408 F. Supp. at 
1242-43. 
20. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9-10.  The primary meaning of a word is the pure 
description of it; the secondary meaning of a word may cause the product-source associa-
tion.  For example, the primary meaning of “IVORY” is what an elephant’s tusk is made 
of, whereas, the secondary meaning is the association that “IVORY” is a brand name of 
soap.  Secondary meaning is shown when the public has come to associate the total image 
of the mark with one source.  See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 
851 n.11, 214 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1982). 
21. See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9.  Generic marks identify the product.  See id.  
For example, “Aspirin,” “Kleenex,” “Thermos,” and “Elevator” have fallen victim to 
genericide.  See, e.g., Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. 80 (Dec. Com. 
Pat. 1950) (canceling “escalator” trademark as becoming generic); King-Seeley Thermos 
Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577, 138 U.S.P.Q. 349 (2d Cir. 1963) (“Thermos”); 
Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (D.C.N.Y. 1921) (“Aspirin”); DuPont Cello-
phane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75, 30 U.S.P.Q. 332 (2d Cir.) (“Cellophane”), 
cert. denied, 299 U.S. 601, 299 U.S.P.Q. 601 (1936); Coca Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Bev-
erages, 162 F.2d 280, 73 U.S.P.Q. 518 (1st Cir.) (“Cola”), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 809, 75 
U.S.P.Q. 365 (1947). 
22. See WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 1991) (“The 
trademark statute does not give the appellants any ‘property right’ in their mark except 
‘the right to prevent confusion.’”).  The likelihood of confusion test was first coined in 
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics, 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), where the court 
stated the factors to be (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the degree of similarity between 
the marks; (3) the proximity of the goods; (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will 
bridge the gap; (5) evidence of actual confusion; (6) defendant’s good faith in adopting 
the mark; (7) the quality of the defendant’s products; and (8) the sophistication of the 
buyers.  Id.  These eight factors are referred to as the Polaroid Factors. 
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the several circuits.23  Nevertheless, the proper identification of the 
consumer is a common theme underlying several elements in the 
test.  Most often, the identification of the consumer is part of the 
sophistication-of-the-consumer element or the evidence-of-actual-
confusion element in the test.  Because a trademark survey typi-
cally is used to establish these elements, properly identifying the 
consumer is a significant concern.  In short, strong consumer sur-
vey results can counter a defendant’s argument that the plaintiff 
 
23. Although the factors are generally the same, circuits vary as to the wording and 
number of factors.  See, e.g., Pignons SA de Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 
657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1981); Western Publishing Co. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 910 
F.2d 57, 61 (2d Cir. 1990); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 
1229 (3rd Cir. 1978); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 
1984); Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O’Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45 (5th Cir. 1975); Frisch’s Restau-
rants v. Elby’s Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982); 
Nike Inc. v. Just Did It Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993); SquirtCo v. Seven Up 
Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 
348 (9th Cir. 1979); Beer Nuts v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th Cir. 
1983); Dieter v. B & H Indus., 880 F.2d 322, 326 (11th Cir. 1989); In re EI duPont, 476 
F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973); G.H. Mumm & Cie v. Desnoes & Geddes, Ltd., 917 
F.2d 1292, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 1990).  The D.C. circuit looks to guidance from the Ninth, 
Seventh, and Second Circuits.  See Delmatoff, Gerow, Morris, Langhans, Inc. v. Chil-
dren’s Hospital Nat’l Med. Center, 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1136, 1139 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Carl 
Karcher Enters. v. Stars Restaurants Corp., 35 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1125, 1128 (T.T.A.B. 1995). 
The most extensive list of factors used in the test is from In re E.I. du Pont, 476 F.2d 
1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) wherein the court stated that the following thirteen factors 
must be examined:  (1) the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to 
appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression; (2) the similarity of dissimi-
larity and nature of the goods or services as described in an application or registration or 
in connection with which a prior mark is in use; (3) the similarity or dissimilarity of es-
tablished, likely to continue trade channels; (4) the conditions under which and buyers to 
whom sales are made, that is, impulse versus careful, sophisticated purchasing; (5) the 
fame of the prior mark (sales, advertising, length of use); (6) the number and nature of 
similar marks in use on similar goods; (7) the nature and extent of any actual confusion; 
(8) the length of time during and conditions under which there has been concurrent use 
without evidence of actual confusion; (9) the variety of the goods on which a mark is or 
is not used (house mark, family mark, product mark); (10) the market interface between 
the applicant and the owner of the prior mark:  (i) a mere consent to register; (ii) agree-
ment provisions designed to preclude confusion, for example, limitations on continued 
use of the marks by each party; (iii) assignment of a mark, application registration, and 
goodwill of the related business; and (iv) laches and estoppel attributable to the owner of 
the prior mark and indicative of lack of confusion; (11) the extent to which applicant has 
right to exclude others from use of its mark on its goods; (12) the extent of potential con-
fusion, whether de minimus or substantial; or (m) any other established fact probative to 
the effect of use.  Id. 
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failed to prove actual confusion.24 
B. Consumer Surveys and the Requirements for Protectable 
Marks 
Consumer identification is significant in determining whether 
the putative mark warrants any protection.  For example, it is 
axiomatic that descriptive marks are not protectable without show-
ing acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.25  Ac-
cordingly, when faced with a contestable trademark,26 a defendant 
will always argue that the mark warrants no protection unless the 
trademark holder proves secondary meaning.  Suggestive marks, 
on the other hand, are protectable without this showing.27  Secon-
dary meaning can be established by showing survey evidence, the 
length and manner of use of the name, the nature and extent of ad-
vertising and promotion of the name, the volume of sales, and in-
 
24. See, e.g., Allied Mktg. Group, Inc. v. CDL Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 813 (5th 
Cir. 1989) (finding that it is not necessary to demonstrate actual confusion in order to 
prevail on a trade dress infringement claim); Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Pur-
chasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 704 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that it would be “exceed-
ingly difficult to detect instances of actual confusion when, as here, the goods are rela-
tively inexpensive and their actual properties are exactly identical”); Brunswick Corp. v. 
Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 521 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that a fining of no actual con-
fusion is not fatal to a case); Union Carbide Corp .v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 383 
(7th Cir. 1976) (holding it unnecessary to show actual confusion). 
25. Under the incontestable mark provisions of the Lanham Act, Trademark Act of 
1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1051-1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998)), an incontestable mark cannot be challenged on 
the grounds that the mark is descriptive.  15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1994).  Therefore, the pro-
prietor of a disputably descriptive mark should file the necessary affidavits to transform 
the mark into an incontestable one.  An incontestable descriptive mark owner need not 
proffer any evidence of secondary meaning. 
As another note, registered trademark infringement is governed by section 32(1) of 
the Lanham Act.  15 U.S.C. § 1114(1).  Trade dress, unregistered mark infringement, and 
unfair competition are governed by section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.  Id. § 1125(a).  
Also, the new federal dilution statute is governed by section 43(c) of the Lanham Act.  Id. 
§ 1125(c). 
26. See id. § 1065.  Under this provision, an allegedly descriptive mark becomes 
incontestable once the section 8 and section 15 affidavits are filed and accepted.  Id.  
Therefore, a defendant cannot defeat the mark by alleging descriptiveness because de-
scriptiveness is not one of the enumerated defenses.  See id. § 1115(b) (listing the sole 
grounds for challenging the validity of an incontestable mark). 
27. See Harlem Wizards Entertainment Basketball v. NBA Properties, 952 F. Supp. 
1084, 1092-93 (D.N.J. 1997). 
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stances of actual confusion.28  Consumer identification in properly 
conducted surveys will prove secondary meaning and bestow pro-
tection to a descriptive mark. 
C. The Role of the Survey in a Dilution Claim 
Consumer identification plays a role in establishing dilution.  
The Lanham Act29 defines dilution as “the lessening of the capac-
ity of a famous trademark to identify and distinguish goods and 
services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition 
between the owner of the famous mark and the other parties, or (2) 
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”30  Dilution occurs 
when tarnishment31 or blurring32 erodes a famous mark’s power to 
identify and distinguish goods and services.33  Dilution applies 
only to famous marks, that is, marks with a high degree of recogni-
tion among the relevant consumers in the trade.34  Therefore, in a 
 
28. See Security Center v. First Nat’l Security Centers, 750 F.2d 1295, 1301 (5th 
Cir. 1985). 
29. Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1988 & Supp. 1988)). 
30. Id. § 1127. 
31. Tarnishment arises when a famous trademark is linked to goods of poor quality, 
or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering be-
liefs about the owner or its products.  See Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. 
Supp. 1183, 1191 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
32. Blurring typically involves the “whittling away of an established trademark’s 
selling power and value through its unauthorized use by others upon dissimilar products.”  
See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d 
Cir. 1989). 
33. See Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Utah Division of 
Travel, 42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1161, 1166 (1997). 
34. See Mead Data, 875 F.2d at 1030.  The elements in determining whether the 
putative mark is famous includes: 
(i) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (ii) the dura-
tion and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods; (iii) the dura-
tion and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; (iv) the geographical 
extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; (v) the channels of trade 
for the goods with which the mark is used; (vi) the degree of recognition of the 
mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks’ owner and 
the person against whom the [injunction] is sought; (vii) the nature and extent 
of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and (viii) whether the mark 
was registered under the Trademark Act of 03 March 1881, or the Trademark 
Act of 20 February 1905, or on the principal register. 
Panavision Int’l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1908, 1913 (C.D. 
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dilution case, because the mark must be famous, the degree of rec-
ognition of the mark in the trading areas or channels of trade is of 
key importance.  In any case, any party seeking to proffer a trade-
mark survey at trial must first determine the persons to whom the 
mark is famous. 
In sum, the dilution, likelihood of confusion, and secondary 
meaning tests require the parties to determine the relevant universe 
of consumers who would be confused by an infringing mark.  Only 
when the relevant universe of consumers is clearly identified can 
the parties complete a trademark survey.  More courts are insisting 
on surveys to evidence the likelihood of confusion, the fame, or the 
secondary meaning of marks.35  Failure to produce such a survey, 
or producing a defective survey, is inevitably fatal to the survey 
proponent’s case.36  It is noteworthy that in one case in which nei-
ther party produced any consumer survey, a judge admonished the 
attorneys for both for laxity.37  But failure to produce a survey may 
cause more then embarrassment for lawyers; it may preclude a 
finding of actual confusion.38 
D. Evidentiary Rules for Surveys:  Making the Proper Proffer 
Because judges give great weight to the results of a survey,39 
the implication is that plaintiffs and defendants should proffer a 
 
Cal. 1996). 
35. See Jones, supra note 4; Helene D. Jaffee & Robert G. Sugarman, The Use of 
Experts and Survey Evidence in Copyright, Trademark and Unfair Competition Litiga-
tion, 463 PLI/PAT. 477, 477 (1996). 
36. See Jaffee & Sugarman, supra note 35, at 477. 
37. See Gimix, Inc. v. JS & A Group, 213 U.S.P.Q. 1005, 1006 (N.D. Ill. 1982), 
aff’d on other grounds, 699 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1983); see also Eagle Snacks, Inc. v. Na-
bisco Brands, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 571, 583 (D.N.J. 1985); Springs Mills, Inc. v. Ultra-
cashmere House, Ltd., 532 F. Supp. 1203, 1218 n.25 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev’d, 689 F.2d 
1127 (2d Cir. 1982).  Failure to produce a survey while having the economic resources to 
do so is not looked upon fondly.  See Information Clearing House, Inc. v. Find Magazine, 
492 F. Supp. 147, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
38. See Essence Communications, Inc. v. Singh Indus., 703 F. Supp. 261, 269 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).  The lack of survey evidence counts against finding actual confusion.  
See Casa Editrice Bonechi, SRL v. Irving Weisdorf & Co., 37 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1417, 1425 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting strong disfavor with the plaintiff who produced evidence of ac-
tual confusion by testimony but failed to produce a survey or opinion poll). 
39. See 2 T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 32:55 (2nd ed. 
1984). 
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proper survey to prove or refute the issues at trial.  Thus the use of 
a survey is not without its own attendant problems.40  Because a 
survey measures within a certain degree of statistical deviation,41 
the criteria for the trustworthiness of survey evidence are exten-
sive.42  First, the universe must be properly defined.43  Second, a 
representative sample of that universe must participate in the sur-
vey.44  Third, the questions asked of respondents must be framed in 
a clear, precise, and non-leading manner.45  Fourth, the survey 
must be a double-blind study, that is, sound interview procedures 
must be followed by competent interviewers who have no knowl-
edge of the litigation or the purpose for which the survey is being 
conducted.46  Fifth, the data gathered must be reported accu-
rately.47  Sixth, the data must be analyzed in accordance with ac-
cepted statistical principles.48  Finally, the whole process must be 
conducted objectively.49 
As with any other type of evidence, the survey is subject to at-
tack.  The most common attacks include objections for hearsay, 
bias, and inadequate definition of the universe of respondents.50  
 
40. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 684, 137 
U.S.P.Q. 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 
385-88 (7th Cir. 1976).  The survey data must assure the trier of fact of its reliability and 
also act as a basis of foundation for expert testimony.  See FED. R. EVID. 703. 
41. See William H. Morris Co. v. Group W, 66 F.3d 255, 258 (9th Cir. 1995) (re-
quiring a plaintiff to show that a statistically significant part of the consuming public was 
mislead in a false advertising claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act). 
42. See Weight Watchers Int’l, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1321, 1330-31 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
43. See id. at 1330. 
44. See id. 
45. See id. at 1330-31. 
46. See id. at 1331. 
47. See id. 
48. See id. 
49. See id. 
50. See HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE TRIAL OF PROTRACTED 
CASES, reprinted in 25 F.R.D. 351, 429 (1960) (stating the guidelines for the admissibil-
ity of survey evidence).  Because this Article focuses on the definition of the universe and 
the survey methodology, with the exception of the following text, it does not discuss bias 
in the questions.  Objections to questions premised on bias tend to focus on the use of 
leading questions or the sequence of questions asked; some questions tend to dupe the 
respondent into responding wrongly or improperly.  See Ralston Purina Co. v. Quaker 
Oats Co., 169 U.S.P.Q. 508, 509 (T.T.A.B. 1971); Wuv’s Int’l, Inc. v. Love’s Enters., 
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Hearsay objections are most often summarily dismissed.51 
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR PROHIBITING CONFUSION 
Trademark and trade dress law are designed to protect consum-
ers from confusingly similar marks.52  Generally, it is believed that 
consumers are unable to distinguish between different products.  
As a result, they require re-education each time they purchase a 
product.  Therefore, trademark protection allows the trademark 
holder to distinguish its own goods from those of its competitors 
by creating a public association with the goods.53  In this manner, 
the public association creates the goodwill.54 
 
208 U.S.P.Q. 736, 755 (D. Col. 1980) (noting that a survey question deliberately sug-
gested that plaintiff’s restaurants may be connected with another commercial entity iden-
tified as a restaurant); Beneficial Corp. v. Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F. Supp. 445, 450 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Sears, Roebuck v. All States Life Ins., 246 F.2d 161, 171 (5th Cir. 
1957) (noting that the sequence of the questions, rather than the questions themselves, 
tainted the results of the survey); Esquire Sportswear Mfg. Co. v. Genesco, Inc., 141 
U.S.P.Q. 400, 404 (T.T.A.B. 1964) (noting that the survey questions referred to the pend-
ing litigation and phrased questions in a manner sympathetic to the litigation). 
51. According to the definition of hearsay in Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, does not apply because the survey is designed for what the respondent believes, 
rather than the truth of what they believe. FED. R. EVID. 801  In addition, Rule 803(1) of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence allows for an exception to hearsay in that it allows for a 
present sense impression, id. 803(1), such as the statement, “These marks are confusing 
to me.”  Similarly, Rule 803(3) allows an exception for the respondent’s state of mind.  
Id. 803(3).  Finally, the catch-all provision of Rule 803(24) allows for a liberal construc-
tion of the rules and subsequent admission of the survey.  Id. 803(24); see also Casa Edi-
trice Bonechi, SRL v. Irving Weisdorf & Co., 37 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1417, 1424-25 n.12 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995).  In Casa Editrice, the court recognized that “hearsay evidence has tradi-
tionally been considered by courts evaluating actual confusion–surveys and opinion polls, 
for example, though technically hearsay, are admissible to show evidence of actual con-
fusion.”  Casa Editrice, 37 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1424-25 n.12.  In addition, “the evidence is not 
hearsay to the extent that the testimony evidences or otherwise expresses customers’ 
then-existing state of mind, to wit, their confusion as to the source of plaintiff’s goods.”  
Id. 
52. See Peaches Entertainment Corp. v. Entertainment Repertoire Assocs., 62 F.3d 
690, 692 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that the Lanham Act was designed to protect both con-
sumer’s confidence in quality and source of goods and the right holder’s goodwill in their 
products). 
53. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 828. 
54. See James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274, 192 
U.S.P.Q. 555 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that a trademark itself is not infringed, rather the 
right of the public to be free of confusion and the right of the trademark owner to control 
his product’s reputation is infringed). 
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The congressional purpose behind the Lanham Act mimics the 
general rule of protecting the consumers and the goodwill of the 
mark.55  Congress maintains that it must provide the public with a 
trustworthy technique for identifying products, thereby permitting 
the public to distinguish products.56  Similarly, the trademark 
owner is rewarded for the time, effort, and money spent in present-
ing the product to the public.57  Trademark owners are protected 
from misappropriation by pirates and cheats.58  In short, trademark 
law seeks to protect the public from deceit, foster fair competition, 
and secure to businesspersons the advantages of their reputation 
and goodwill.59 
A. Establishing Consumer Confusion 
To protect both the public and private interests in an infringe-
ment action, the mark holder must establish consumer confusion.60  
There are three types of actionable confusion:  (1) confusion as to 
the source, (2) confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation, and (3) 
reverse confusion.61 
 
55. The congressionally stated purpose for protecting trademarks under the Lanham 
Act is “to protect the public from deceit, to foster competition, and to secure to the busi-
ness community the advantages of reputation and goodwill by preventing their diversion 
from those who have created them to those who have not.”  S. REP. NO. 79-1333, 79th 
Cong., at 5 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275. 
56. See Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1297, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 
1992).  According to Representative Fritz G. Lanham, the sponsor of the Lanham Act, 
one purpose of the statute was “to protect the public so that it may be confident that, in 
purchasing a product bearing a particular trade-mark, with [sic] it favorably knows, it will 
get the product which it asks for and wants to get.”  Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 
2 (1945)). 
57. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 829. 
58. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 23 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1081, 
1090 n.19 (1992) (J. Stevens, concurring). 
59. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-219, at 3.  According to House Report 219, “Trade-marks 
encourage the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the good 
reputation which excellence creates.”  Id. 
60. See Sunmark, Inc. v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, 64 F.3d 1055, 1060, 36 U.S.P.Q. 
2d 1046 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that plaintiff must establish a likelihood of confusion in 
order to succeed in the infringement action). 
61. See 3 A.R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION TRADEMARK AND MONOPOLIES, § 
20.01-.03 (4th ed. 1983); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, § 23.1. 
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1. Source Confusion 
Source confusion occurs when there is a mistaken belief that 
the junior user’s62 goods originate from the source of goods mar-
keted under the senior user’s mark.63  That is, the confusion occurs 
when a consumer believes that the junior user’s product is actually 
the senior user’s product.64  To prove infringement, the public need 
not know the identity of the senior source because it is sufficient 
that the public believes both products emanate from the same 
source.65  This is known as the anonymous source rule.66 
2. Affiliation Confusion 
In contrast to confusion as to the source, confusion as to spon-
sorship or affiliation67 most commonly occurs when the consuming 
public believes that the junior user’s product is somehow affiliated, 
sponsored, or connected with the senior user.68  Affiliation confu-
sion is easier to prove if the marks are used on similar or related 
products, but more difficult if the relation between the products is 
attenuated.  To establish the likelihood of confusion, the test is not 
whether the goods are identical or competitive in nature.  Rather, it 
is sufficient that the goods are related in some manner, or that they 
might both end up in a purchaser’s hands who reasonably believes 
 
62. For the sake of clarity, unless otherwise noted, a senior user is assumed to be the 
rightful trademark holder and the first entrant in the field.  In contrast, a junior user is as-
sumed to be the alleged infringer and most often the second comer into the field. 
63. See McCoy v. Mutsuboshi Cutlery, 67 F.3d 917, 923-24, 36 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1289 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (involving confusion as to the source of genuine goods), cert. denied, 
516 U.S. 1174 (1996). 
64. See David S. Welkowitz, The Problem of Concurrent Use of Trademarks:  An 
Old/New Proposal, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 315 (1994). 
65. See A. Samuel Oddi, Consumer Motivation in Trademark and Unfair Competi-
tion Law:  On the Importance of Source, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986). 
66. See Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  
The anonymous source rule is directed to the situation where a typical buyer would not 
know the corporate identity of the source.  See id. 
67. See, e.g., Equine Techs. v. Equitechnology, 68 F.3d 542, 544, 36 U.S.P.Q. 2d 
1659 (1st Cir. 1995) (sponsorship confusion). 
68. See Nike, Inc. v. Just Did It Enters., 28 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1385, 1387 (7th Cir. 1993).  
Customer “confusion” is not restricted to a mistake regarding the source of the goods; 
courts also consider whether the customer would believe that the trademark owner spon-
sored, endorsed, or was otherwise affiliated with the product.  See id. 
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that the goods have a common origin because of the identical 
trademarks.69  Nonetheless, there is no clear resolution of how re-
lated the parties’ goods must be for the use of similar trademarks to 
be actionable.70  Hence, courts will most likely afford stronger pro-
tection against use on a broader range of goods, especially where 
the junior user’s mark is identical to that of the senior user’s.71 
3. Reverse Confusion 
Reverse confusion, in contrast to both source and affiliation 
confusion, occurs when the marks used by the parties causes the 
public to believe that the senior user’s products emanate or are 
sponsored by the junior user.72  Reverse confusion is best illus-
trated by way of example.  In Big O Tires Dealers, Inc. v. Good-
year Tire & Rubber Co.,73 Big O Tires Dealers, Inc. (“Big O”) 
brought action against Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (“Goodyear”) 
alleging violations of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.74  Big O 
was a tire buying organization, with a net worth of about $200,000, 
that operated in about fourteen states.75  Goodyear, the world’s 
largest tire manufacturer, had sales in the billions.76  Big O was the 
senior user of the “Bigfoot” mark on tires.77  The reverse confusion 
 
69. See Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Suave Shoes Corp., 13 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1618, 1624 
(T.T.A.B. 1989). 
70. See id. 
71. See id. 
72. See Big O Tires Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 
1371, 195 U.S.P.Q. 417 (10th Cir. 1977); see also Harlem Wizards Entertainment Bas-
ketball v. NBA Properties, 952 F. Supp. 1084 (D.N.J. 1997); Banff, Ltd. v. Federated 
Dept. Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1988); Yarmuth Dion v. D’Ion Furs, 
835 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1987); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc’s BR Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 
837, 845 (9th Cir. 1987); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 
F.2d 591, 596 (5th Cir. 1985); Plus Products v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 
1003-04 (2d Cir. 1983); Master Card Int’l, Inc. v. Arbel, 13 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1958, 1963-64 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989); Elizabeth Taylor Cosmetics Co. v. Annick Goutal, S.A.R.L., 673 F. 
Supp. 1238, 1249 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 
U.S. 215, 247 (1918); Victory Pipe Craftsmen, Inc. v. Faberge, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 551, 
555-56 (N.D. Ill. 1984); cf. Jeffrey v. Cannon Films, Inc., 3 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1373, 1381-82 
(D. Col. 1987). 
73. 561 F.2d 1365, 195 U.S.P.Q. 417 (10th Cir. 1977). 
74. Id. at 1367. 
75. See id. 
76. See id. 
77. See id. at 1368 
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occurred when Goodyear started using “Bigfoot” also.78  Due to 
the sheer size and market penetration of Goodyear, the consuming 
public wrongly believed that Goodyear was the senior user and that 
Big O was somehow affiliated or sponsored by Goodyear.79 
Reverse confusion typically occurs in situations where the sec-
ond-comers, such as Goodyear, use their size and market penetra-
tion in an attempt to overwhelm the first, but smaller, user.80  If re-
verse confusion were not prohibited, notwithstanding the senior 
user’s prior use, the senior user would lose control of its mark and 
the goodwill created by the mark, when a junior, but larger, user 
utilizes the mark.81  Moreover, because the Lanham Act seeks to 
minimize public confusion,82 it attempts to prevent the public from 
being deceived into believing that the senior user’s product ema-
nates from, or is sponsored by, the junior user.83 
B. Temporal and Spatial Relationship Theories 
After recognizing the types of actionable confusion that can 
occur, the next inquiry delves into when such confusion can be 
measured.  In any purchase time line, there are three distinct stages 
related to the purchase.  First is the pre-purchase time period when 
the purchaser is contemplating the purchase or is being influenced 
to make a purchase.  The second time frame is the actual purchase.  
This is the in-store period and is frequently known as the point of 
sale or point of purchase.84  The actual time of the purchase is the 
only readily ascertainable period in the time line.  By contrast, it is 
nearly impossible to determine exactly when the consumer began 
to contemplate the purchase.  The final time period is the post-sale 
period, which normally is associated with the use of the product or 
 
78. See id. 
79. See id. at 1371-72. 
80. See id. at 1371 
81. See id. 
82. See H.R. REP. NO. 79-219 (1945). 
83. See S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 1 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274 (de-
scribing the goals of the Lanham Act). 
84. See generally Warren S. Grimes, Spiff, Polish, and Consumer Demand Quality:  
Vertical Price Restraints Revisited, 80 CAL. L. REV. 817 (1992) (discussing point-of-sale 
activities). 
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service or the time when others view the purchase.85  It is similar to 
pre-purchase period in that it is difficult to ascertain when any 
post-purchase confusion ends. 
Consumer confusion can be measured under both a temporal 
and a spatial relationship.  In the temporal relationship theory, con-
fusion vests when the confusion occurs in the purchase time line, 
given that the time of purchase is fixed.  The temporal relationship 
does not distinguish between the purchaser and non-purchaser per 
se because this theory only inquires whether actionable confusion 
existed during the pre-purchase, point of purchase, or post-
purchase time.  On the other hand, the spatial relationship theory 
identifies the relationship between the confused person and the 
point of purchase person.  In other words, the spatial relationship 
theory determines the degree of privity that exists between the pur-
chaser and others.  Given that the time of the purchase is fixed, this 
theory queries which of the consumers related to the purchaser 
may have some actionable confusion. 
These theories are best illustrated by way of example.  Suppose 
a parent goes to a toy store to purchase a toy for her child.  If we 
were to freeze time at the point of purchase, the temporal relation-
ship theory will determine whether the parent who buys the toy 
was confused before walking into the store, while purchasing the 
toy, or after purchasing the toy.  In the temporal relationship the-
ory, only the parent’s confusion is important.  The parent might 
have been confused in the pre-purchase period and the confusion 
might have carried through into the post-purchase period.  In the 
alternative, the parent might have been confused in the pre-
purchase period, but while at the store, in-store disclaimers or point 
of purchase posters dispelled her confusion.  Because the easiest 
identifiable person is this purchaser, many courts focus exclusively 
on this person to determine whether any actionable confusion ex-
ists.86 
 
85. See Malla Pollack, Your Image is My Image:  When Advertising Dedicates 
Trademarks to the Public Domain—With an Example from the Trademark Counterfeiting 
Act of 1984, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1392 (1993). 
86. See id.; Molly S. Cusson, Reverse Confusion:  Modifying the Polaroid Factors 
to Achieve Consistent Results, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 179, 217 
(1995). 
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To focus on purchaser confusion, though, is not enough.  Many 
people, other than the purchaser, should be considered as well.  
The spatial relationship theory does exactly that.  Recall that the 
point of purchase is fixed in time.  The spatial relationship theory 
ascertains whom, other than the purchaser, is confused at the point 
of purchase.  Revisiting the toy store, we find that even though it is 
the parent who actually purchases the toy, her child may have been 
confused before the parent went to the store and remains confused  
while the parent completes the purchase, and even afterward.  Al-
though the parent may have benefited from in-store disclaimers or 
other confusion dispelling tactics, the child did not. 
A plaintiff who focuses only on the purchaser limits the num-
ber of potential survey respondents.  Similarly, a plaintiff’s case 
would be severely undermined if the court accepted a defendant’s 
argument that focused on the absence of purchaser confusion. 
1. Judicial Focus on Purchaser Confusion 
Under the temporal relationship theory, the focus is on the pur-
chaser and when the purchaser may have been confused.  Some 
courts require proof that the purchaser be confused at the point of 
purchase.87  Often, courts will consider the degree of care exer-
cised by the purchaser.88  Courts typically employ an ordinary pur-
chaser standard.89 
Point of purchase confusion is the most widely analyzed factor 
for determining when confusion occurs or vests.  When courts ap-
ply this approach alone, however, they act contrary to the intent 
behind the 1962 amendment to the Lanham Act,90 which deleted 
 
87. See Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 378, 207 U.S.P.Q. 465 
(1st Cir. 1980); McKee Baking Co. v. Interstate Brands Corp., 738 F. Supp. 1272, 1275, 
17 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1528 (E.D. Mo. 1990); American Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, 
Inc., 579 F. Supp. 607, 616, 221 U.S.P.Q. 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Beneficial Corp. v. 
Beneficial Capital Corp., 529 F. Supp. 445, 450, 213 U.S.P.Q. 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
88. See Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1260, 9 U.S.P.Q. 2d 
1870 (5th Cir. 1989); Jordache Enters. v. Hogg-Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1487, 4 
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1216 (10th Cir. 1987); Maxim’s, Ltd. v. Badonsky, 772 F.2d 388, 227 
U.S.P.Q. 316, 320 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985); see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, § 23.29. 
89. See 3 A.R. CALLMAN, supra note 61, § 20.09; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, § 
23.27-29. 
90. Amendment of October 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. (76 
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the word “purchaser.”91  Under that amendment, Congress in-
tended to go beyond the actual purchaser and protect potential pur-
chasers.92 
After determining when confusion has occurred, the next in-
quiry is whether an appreciable number of ordinary purchasers are 
likely to be confused.93  An ordinary purchaser is one who is ex-
pected to exercise that degree of care, caution, power, and percep-
tion appropriate to the kind of choice he faces in the marketplace.94  
That was the standard applied in Hormel Foods v. Jim Henson 
Productions,95 in which the court found no confusion between 
Sp’am (a Muppet) and Spam (the meat product).96  The court 
found the relevant inquiry to be whether an appreciable number of 
ordinarily prudent purchasers are likely to be misled.97  As with 
any reasonably prudent purchaser standard, there is no mathemati-
cal precision to predict when that threshold is met.98 
There is an inverse relationship between the degree of care ex-
ercised and the likelihood of confusion.99  As the degree of care in-
creases, the likelihood of confusion decreases.100  As consumers 
become more careful, they are more likely to examine the goods or 
 
Stat. 773) 896. 
91. Id. 
92. See S. REP. NO. 87-2107 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2851. 
93. See General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1987); Centaur 
Communications, Ltd. v. ASM Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217 (2d Cir. 1987); 
Lever Brothers Co. v. American Bakeries Co., 693 F.2d 251, 253 (2d Cir. 1982); McGre-
gor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1979). 
94. See 3 A.R. CALLMAN, supra note 61, § 20.09; 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, § 
23.27. 
95. 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996). 
96. See id. at 502. 
97. Id. (citing Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 58 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979)). 
98. See Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1186 (6th Cir. 1988). 
99. See Daddy’s Junky Music Stores v. Big Daddy’s Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 
275, 280 (6th Cir. 1997). 
Mathematically, the inverse relationship is expressed as (Cd ∝ 1\ Loc) where Cd is 
the degree of care and Loc is the likelihood of confusion. 
100. See Daddy’s Junky, 109 F.3d at 285; U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 1998 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6432, at *27 (D. Kan. 1998).  But see Dream Team Collectibles, Inc. v. 
NBA Properties, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1401, 1417 (finding that a high degree of care does 
not necessarily reduce likelihood of confusion). 
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services in question.101  Close scrutiny of goods and trademarks 
generally reduces the likelihood that consumers will confuse simi-
lar marks.102  One method of identifying a careful consumer is to 
focus on the cost of goods with respect to the proportionate care 
exercised.103  As price increases, the likelihood of confusion de-
creases104 under the assumption that higher prices prompt consum-
ers to exercise more care.105  Courts will assume that purchasers 
are likely to be more discriminating and source conscious when 
purchasing an expensive product.106  Arguably, purchasers of 
expensive products take greater time in purchasing, investigate all 
of the facts, shop for competing products, and spend money only 
when convinced that a particular trademark on the trademarked 
product is precisely what is desired.107  In making purchasing deci-
sions regarding expensive goods, the reasonably prudent person 
standard is elevated to the standard of the discriminating pur-
chaser.108 
Contrast consumer behavior with regard to costly goods with 
consumer behavior during the purchase of low priced items.  As 
 
101. See Abraham Zion Corp. v. Harry P. Lebow, 593 F. Supp. 551, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 
1984). 
102. See Russian Kurier, Inc. v. Russian Am. Kurier, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1204, 1210-
11 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (“[T]he sophistication of the buyers is relevant in this case in that a 
newspaper is a product that may be purchased without careful scrutiny, thus increasing 
the likelihood of confusion”). 
103. See AHP Subsidiary Holding Co. v. Stuart Hale Co., 1 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 
1993); SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980). 
The cost of goods in relation to the care exercised can be expressed mathematically 
as (P ∝ Cd) where P is the price of the good or service. 
104. See Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 1989). 
105. See Blue-Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1260 (5th Cir. 
1989); Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1987). 
106. See Blue-Bell, 864 F.2d at 1260; Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1487.  The assumption 
is that where the consumer is buying an expensive product, he is likely to be deliberate in 
his product selection and, therefore, in his differentiation between trademarks.  See Blue-
Bell, 864 F.2d at 1260; Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1487. 
107. See 1 JEROME GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, § 5.08, at 5-
146, 5-148 (1993).  Nevertheless, a properly trademarked good does not always reflect 
what the consumer wanted.  This frequently occurs in sales involving parallel importation 
or gray market goods.  See Shashank Upadhye, Rewriting the Lanham Act to Bar the Im-
portation of Gray Market Goods, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 99 (1996). 
108. Weiss Assocs. v. HRL Assocs., 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1840, 1842 (Fed. Cir. 1990); 2 
MCCARTHY, supra note 39, § 23:28, at 130. 
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the cost decreases, the level of care decreases because the good is 
cheap and it is conducive to impulse buying.109  Because the pur-
chaser is buying a low priced item and is shopping on impulse, the 
purchase decision is made with little or no thought nor any ad-
vance preparation.110  Therefore, very little care is exercised.111 
Another standard, which is not directly related to the price of 
the product, determines whether the purchaser is a professional 
buyer, that is, an individual who has come to the purchasing deci-
sion with knowledge about the goods or services.112  This group is 
normally held to a higher standard.113  But courts sometimes co-
mingle the standards of care regarding professional status with 
price.114  That results in an artificially high standard on the ordi-
nary, albeit professional, purchaser if the purchased product is ex-
pensive.115  For example, if the price of the good is low, then a low 
burden will be imposed.  Due to the professional status of the pur-
chaser, however, a higher burden is imposed, which inevitably 
leads to a finding of no confusion as the professional standard 
dominates over the price standard.116  But some courts have found 
a likelihood of confusion even when dealing with expensive goods, 
and the purchasers were expected to exercise a high degree of 
 
109. See Beer Nuts v. Clover Club Foods Co., 805 F.2d 920, 926 (10th Cir. 1986); 
Knorr-Narhmittel, A.G. v. Reese Finer Foods, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 787, 794 (D.N.J. 1988). 
110. See TV Land v. Viacom Int’l, 908 F. Supp. 543, 552 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (noting 
that consumers take less time purchasing low cost items and haste increases the possibil-
ity of confusion). 
111. See BeerNuts, 805 F.2d at 926; see also 1 GILSON, supra note 107, § 508, at 5-
146. 
112. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 39, § 23.29. 
113. See id. 
114. See Michael J. Allen, The Role of Actual Confusion Evidence in Federal 
Trademark Infringement Litigation, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 19, 45 (1994). 
115. See id. 
116. See Blue-Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1989); 
Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987); cf. Fuji Photo Film 
Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 595, 225 U.S.P.Q. 540 (5th Cir. 
1985); AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 353, 204 U.S.P.Q. 808 (9th Cir. 
1979); Truck Equipment Serv. Co. v. Freuhauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1220-21, 191 
U.S.P.Q. 79 (8th Cir. 1976); Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera Co., 451 F.2d 
1190, 1195, 171 U.S.P.Q. 769 (2d Cir. 1971); Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg 
Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 716-17, 180 U.S.P.Q. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973). 
UPADHYE.TYP 9/29/2006  4:44 PM 
570 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:549 
care.117 
One situation warranting careful examination is that where the 
purchaser was confused prior to making the purchase but was no 
longer confused at the point of purchase.  Under this analysis, ac-
tionable confusion can exist early in the purchase decision time 
line, even though at the time of purchase, there is no longer any 
confusion.  For example, in HRL Associates, Inc. v. Weiss Associ-
ates, Inc.,118 the marks covered computerized maintenance, inven-
tory, and equipment tracking software.119  The price of the soft-
ware ranged from $6,000 to $10,000 and generally was purchased 
after the buyer was extensively exposed to  literature and had ex-
perimented with the actual software.120  Oftentimes, the evaluation 
period lasted over nine months after first contact.121  To this end, 
the defendant argued that any initial confusion was dispelled by 
virtue of the buyer’s protracted discussion.122  In addition, the de-
fendant argued that the potential consumers were sophisticated and 
were not confused at the point of sale.123 
The Trademark Trial and Appeals Board (“TTAB”) ruled in 
HRL Associates that the “Trademark Act does not make a distinc-
tion between confusion arising at an early stage in the purchasing 
process and confusion arising at a later stage.”124  The TTAB’s ra-
tionale was that the Lanham Act prohibited registration of marks 
that were likely to cause confusion between the marks, irrespective 
of when and where this confusion occurred in the marketing or the 
sale.125  Furthermore, the TTAB stated that the confusion to the po-
tential purchaser, early in the purchasing decision, was just as inju-
rious as any confusion in the actual purchaser, during or after the 
time of purchase.126  Most important, the TTAB noted that the so-
 
117. See Fuji Photo Film, 754 F.2d 591; AMF, 599 F.2d 341; Truck Equipment, 536 
F.2d at 1220-21. 
118. 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1819 (T.T.A.B. 1989). 
119. Id. 
120. See id. 
121. See id. at 1822. 
122. See id. 
123. See id. 
124. See id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
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phistication of the purchaser in this particular scenario was not 
enough to overcome the likelihood of confusion of potential pur-
chasers early in the purchase decision time line.127 
It is established that focussing purely on the purchaser leads to 
a finding in contradiction of the plain language of the Lanham Act.  
In addition, a focus on purchasers limits the universe of consumers 
that can participate in the trademark survey.  Out of the entire uni-
verse of people, the set of all consumers—purchasers and non-
purchasers—is greater than the set of purchasers.  Therefore, to 
provide for a meaningful survey with the greatest chance of dem-
onstrating confusion in the consuming public, the survey must 
identify another universe of non-purchasers who are also confused. 
2. Judicial Focus on Non-Purchaser Confusion 
Under the spatial relationship theory, confusion of purchasers 
and non-purchasers are equally important.  Arguably, considering 
non-purchasers is more important to a plaintiff because of the in-
crease in possible survey respondents.  Since the 1962 amendment 
to the Lanham Act, some courts have expanded the likelihood of 
confusion beyond the point of sale purchaser in order to incorpo-
rate the potential purchasers and the general public.128  The poten-
tial purchaser is one who is contemplating a purchase based on a 
desire to buy a certain product.129  The general public is comprised 
of the people who observe others using the goods, but who are not 
contemplating an imminent purchase.130  As with purchaser confu-
sion, there are three types of non-purchaser confusion:  (1) pre-sale 
confusion, (2) point of purchase confusion, and (3) post-sale con-
fusion. 
 
127. Id. at 1823. 
128. See Pollack, supra note 85, at 1485; Landscape Forms v. Columbia Cascade 
Co., 113 F.3d 373, 382 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he likelihood of confusion test concerns not 
only potential purchasers but also the general public.”); United States v. Hon, 904 F.2d 
803, 804-05 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that the jury could consider confusion of members of 
the general public as well as the purchasing public). 
129. See Ferrari S.P.A. v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991). 
130. See generally Pollack, supra note 85 (describing non-purchaser observers). 
UPADHYE.TYP 9/29/2006  4:44 PM 
572 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 8:549 
i. Pre-Sale Confusion 
In the wake of the 1962 amendment, the courts have acknowl-
edged the confusion of potential customers.131  In an early case, 
Communications Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc.,132 the court also 
dealt with pre-sale confusion.133  In this case, the plaintiff used 
“COMSAT” as a registered trade name and service mark in its 
worldwide satellite communications system.134  Defendant, Com-
cet, Inc. (“Comcet”), marketed communication computers to proc-
ess data sent over telephone and teletype lines.135  According to the 
court, the case’s outcome turned on the likelihood of confusion 
among prospective consumers.136  In addition, the court noted that, 
when the parties are not competitors, the infringement issue rests 
on the likelihood of confusion about the source or sponsorship of 
the goods and services marketed.137  Despite the lack of an rela-
tionship between the goods, Comcet argued that its purchasers are 
so sophisticated and so knowledgeable that they would not be con-
fused.138  The court held, however, that “the expertise of purchas-
ers does not always assure the absence of confusion.  Even buyers 
of specialized products can assume, even be it wrongfully, that re-
lated companies are the source of goods despite them being non-
competitive goods.”139 
Despite any sophistication of the consumer, pre-sale confusion 
can exist even if consumers do not exercise any significant care.140  
If potential customers are lured away from the senior user because 
the junior user utilized a confusingly similar mark, the result is pre-
sale confusion that is actionable.  In addition, pre-sale confusion, if 
 
131. See Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 
365 F. Supp. 707, 716-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975). 
132. 429 F.2d 1245 (4th Cir. 1970). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 1247. 
135. See id. at 1249. 
136. Id. at 1252. 
137. Id. 
138. See id. 
139. Id. 
140. See Source Perrier, S.A. v. Waters of Saratoga Springs, Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. 617 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding presale confusion using the pecuniary interest rationale versus 
a confusion rationale). 
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it exists, can bolster a showing of actual confusion.141 
In Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Stein-
way & Sons,142 the plaintiff, Grotrian Steinweg, sued the Steinway 
& Sons, the senior user, for a declaratory judgment143 that Grotrian 
Steinweg’s name did not infringe on Steinway & Sons’s trademark 
or trade names for pianos.144  On the basis of surveys conducted by 
parties, the trial court found the presence of actual confusion be-
tween the marks.145  Despite the high cost of the pianos, costing 
from $5,000 to $13,000, the sophistication of the consumer was 
not enough to eliminate confusion.146 
On appeal, the court acknowledged that the impact of confu-
sion was significant when the parties were in direct competition 
over a small class of consumers.147  Thus, it was inescapable that a 
potential purchaser of a piano, upon hearing the name Grotrian 
Steinweg, would associate Grotrian Steinweg’s product with that 
of Steinway & Sons.148  The Grotrian court held that actual confu-
sion or potential confusion at the point of purchase need not be 
shown to prevail in trademark infringement.149  Therefore, accord-
ing to the Grotrian court, confusion on the part of potential con-
sumers is an influential part of the likelihood of confusion analy-
sis.150  The Grotrian case is special because, despite a showing of 
actual confusion, the court also examined pre-sale confusion. 
 
141. See Blockbuster Entertainment Group v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. 
Mich. 1994); Jeffrey R. Kuester & Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, Frames and Meta-Tags:  
An Intellectual Property Analysis, 38 IDEA 243, 248 (1998). 
142. 365 F. Supp. 707, 716-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 
1975). 
143. Id.  A declaratory judgment action may be entertained in the district courts.  
See 15 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).  A declaratory judgment action is brought usually by a jun-
ior user who seeks a declaration that its use of the mark will not infringe the rights of the 
senior user.  Moreover, if the mark is registered, a declaratory judgment action may be 
brought to invalidate such a registration.  Consistent with the terminology of this Article, 
in a declaratory judgment action, the junior user is the plaintiff. 
144. See Grotrian, 365 F. Supp. at 709. 
145. See id. at 716. 
146. See id. 
147. See Grotrian, 523 F.2d at 1340. 
148. See id. 
149. See id. at 1342. 
150. Id. at 1341-42. 
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Although potential consumer confusion has been accepted as a 
theory, it is not required.  In Dreyfus Fund, Inc. v. Royal Bank of 
Canada,151 the court rejected the Royal Bank of Canada’s argu-
ment that a showing of actual confusion was required.152  The court 
held that the legal construct only required that some confusion be 
proved likely, not that it must be shown to persist.153  In this par-
ticular case, Royal Bank of Canada (“Royal Bank”), the defendant, 
used a lion in marketing its banking services.154  Dreyfus Funds, 
Inc. (“Dreyfus Funds”), the plaintiff, sued to enjoin further use of 
the Royal Bank lion.155  Royal Bank argued that the relevant con-
sumers were sophisticated and used great care in conducting busi-
ness with either Royal Bank or Dreyfus Funds.156  The court re-
jected Royal Bank’s argument that the statutory construction 
required a showing of potential purchaser confusion, and that the 
confusion carried through the purchasing process.157  This case re-
iterated that actual confusion of the purchaser was neither required 
nor a predicate for winning trademark infringement. 
In situations where the potential consumer will never have the 
opportunity to inspect the goods or have a face-to-face encounter 
with point of purchase confusion obviators, some courts have held 
this not to be problematic.158  In Television Enterprises Network, 
Inc. v. Entertainment Network, Inc.,159 the court entertained a dis-
pute over the use of the trademark “TEN.”160  According to the 
court, although the programs were expensive, they were not expen-
sive enough to dispel the likelihood of confusion.161  Because most 
commercial transactions were over the phone, the potential pur-
chaser may not have known with whom they were speaking.162  
 
151. 525 F. Supp. 1108, 213 U.S.P.Q. 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
152. Id. at 1124. 
153. Id. at 1119. 
154. Id. at 1111. 
155. See id. 
156. See id. at 1122. 
157. Id. 
158. See Television Enters. Network, Inc. v. Entertainment Network, Inc., 229 
U.S.P.Q. 47 (D.N.J. 1986). 
159. 229 U.S.P.Q. 47 (D.N.J. 1986). 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 49. 
162. See id. 
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Thus even if a deal was not consummated, the initial confusion 
was damaging and wrongful.163 
In Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers, GmbH,164 the court was 
presented with the problem wherein actual consumers of one com-
pany were also potential consumers of the other.165  Complicating 
matters further, both the plaintiff and defendant companies were 
started by the same person, but in different countries.166  The par-
ties argued that potential consumer confusion was not present due 
to the consumers being in different countries.167  The plaintiff sued 
to enjoin the defendant from using “Krupp-Koppers” as a trade-
mark in the United States.168  Although a common owner founded 
both companies, the only relationship between them was one of di-
rect competition.169 
The court ruled that the likelihood of confusion cannot be con-
sidered in a vacuum; it must be determined with respect to certain 
persons.170  Also, according to the court, the 1962 Amendment 
does not restrict actionable confusion to purchasers.171  Therefore, 
the court used a broad interpretation of what constituted forbidden 
confusion and the class of people that the 1962 amendment was 
designed to protect.172  In the end, the relevant consumer universe 
included a class of potential consumers from foreign countries.173 
Pre-purchase confusion may exist and be actionable even 
where there is extensive in-person discussion and personal atten-
tion in the purchase.  In an interesting case, a prior mark holder 
 
163. See id. 
164. 210 U.S.P.Q. 711 (W.D. Pa. 1981). 
165. Id. 
166. See id. at 713 
167. See id. at 718.  Plaintiff’s company engaged in the design, engineering, and 
construction of coal gasification plants, cokes, smelters, and blast furnaces.  See id. at 
712.  Mr. Koppers in Germany founded defendant’s company for the same purpose (ex-
cept it did not manufacture things) prior to Koppers coming to the United States and 
starting the plaintiff-company.  See id. at 713. 
168. See id. at 714. 
169. See id. at 713. 
170. Id. at 717. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. See id. 
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opposed the applicant’s mark at the TTAB.174  The underlying 
products were expensive computer software management tools, 
which were sold to the consumer after extensive negotiations and 
discussion.175  The applicant argued that although there might have 
been initial confusion, there was no confusion at the time of pur-
chase because of the lengthy negotiations.176  Basically, the appli-
cant argued that, because the consumers were sophisticated, after 
the extended evaluation of the products and the discussions, there 
was no confusion at the time of purchase.177  The TTAB held that 
pre-sale confusion was actionable by the opposer because confu-
sion of the potential consumer early in the purchase decision was 
just as likely to cause injury to the opposer as confusion arising 
later.178  On appeal of the TTAB decision, the Federal Circuit did 
not address the issue of initial confusion, but nonetheless affirmed 
the decision of the TTAB and held that there was a likelihood of 
confusion.179 
ii. Point of Purchase Confusion 
Confusion at the point of purchase is most often, measured via 
the purchaser.  Typically, however, there are others who, in their 
confusion, may influence the purchaser.  The best example is the 
parent-child relationship.  For example, in Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. 
Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc.,180 the consumer did not exercise much 
care when purchasing a relatively inexpensive product.181  Also, in 
Toys “R” Us, the parent-purchaser was not the actual user of the 
product.  The parent purchased the product for use by her child, 
and the parent-purchaser was influenced by the desires of the ac-
 
174. See HRL Assocs. v. Weiss Assocs., 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1819 (T.T.A.B. 1989), 
aff’d, 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1840 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
175. See HRL Assocs., 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1820. 
176. See id. at 1822. 
177. See id. 
178. Id. at 1822-23. 
179. HRL Assocs. v. Weiss Assoc., 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1840, 1842 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
180. 559 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
181. Id. at 1199.  As the cost increases, the level of care in choosing the products 
increases.  As the price decreases, however, the level of care paid decreases, as it did in 
this case.  See id. 
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tual user.182  In another toy case, Warner Brothers, Inc. v. Gay 
Toys,183 the relevant non-purchasers were the children who in-
duced their parents to buy toys for them.184  These cases demon-
strate that the children, at the time of the purchase by the parent, 
were confused. 
Similarly, while examining the influencers of the non-
purchasers in Electric Design and Sales, Inc. v. Electronic Data 
Systems Corp.,185 the court’s inquiry turned on whether actual or 
potential purchasers were confused.186  The analysis encompassed 
all individuals that might know of the services and might become 
purchasers.187  The court ruled that it was an error to deny registra-
tion of a trademark without determining the identity of “the rele-
vant persons”—simply because the parties sold goods in the same 
field.188 The court broadly construed “purchasers” and “potential 
purchasers” to include those persons, such as users, who might ac-
tually influence purchasers.189  In further qualifying the universe of 
persons, the court held that, for commercially sold items, only 
those users who might influence future purchasers could be “rele-
vant persons.”190 
The TTAB used an expansive view of non-purchaser confusion 
in American Optical Corp. v. Siemens Aktiengesell-schaft.191  In 
that case, the court ruled that the broad category of persons who 
might be confused included purchasers and prospective purchasers 
 
182. Id. at 1199. 
183. 658 F.2d 76 (2nd Cir. 1981). 
184. Id. at 79. 
185. 954 F.2d 713 (Fed. Cir. 1992).  Where the Examining Attorney and TTAB de-
termined that the application is not entitled to registration, the applicant may appeal this 
registration denial to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) 
(1994).  Section 21(a)(1) of the Lanham Act provides, in pertinent part, for a right of ap-
peal:  “An applicant for registration of a mark . . . who is dissatisfied with the decision of 
the Commissioner or Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, may appeal to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.”  Id. 
186. Electric Design, 954 F.2d at 718. 
187. See id. at 716. 
188. Id. at 719. 
189. Id. at 718. 
190. Id. 
191. 213 U.S.P.Q. 510 (T.T.A.B. 1982). 
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on all levels of distribution.192  It also included those involved in 
the selection of the goods, namely, the decision making process.193  
American Optical and the other relevant cases indicate that non-
purchaser confusion at the point of purchase can be interpreted 
broadly to include those who accompany the purchaser to the store, 
influence the purchaser’s decisions, or make the selection but do 
not actually make the purchase. 
iii. Post-Sale Confusion 
Post-purchase confusion is really non-purchaser presale confu-
sion.  For example, consumer A purchases some goods and, later, 
consumer B sees consumer A using the goods.  Consumer B can be 
confused as to the goods, which impacts on consumer B’s potential 
purchase or decision to buy the good in the future.  Thus, the initial 
purchase by consumer A took place, with or without any confusion, 
but the second-potential purchase by consumer B may be clouded 
with confusion. 
Such a situation can arise when consumer A purchases sneakers 
bearing a trademark confusingly similar to a popular brand name 
sneaker.  If the sneakers portray some poor quality or workman-
ship, consumer B might wrongly attribute these defects to the more 
popular sneaker.  This may negatively impact the sales of the brand 
name sneaker.  Post purchase confusion is especially troublesome 
where point of purchase displays are used to minimize or destroy 
point of purchase confusion.194  In post-purchase confusion, these 
disclaimers are not available for the non-point of sale potential 
purchaser to observe.195 
III. THE RELEVANT UNIVERSE OF CONSUMERS 
There are several views as to whom the trademark laws are to 
protect.  Under the expansive view, the Lanham Act protects 
 
192. Id. 
193. See id. 
194. See Adray v. Adry-Mart, Inc., 68 F.3d 362, 368 (9th Cir. 1995) (using dis-
claimers to obviate likelihood of confusion). 
195. See Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 230 
U.S.P.Q. 831 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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against confusion of any kind on the part of anyone, without limi-
tation as to purchaser or potential purchaser.196  Prior to the 1962 
amendment, Lanham Act protection generally was limited to con-
fusion by the purchaser.  The 1962 amendment,197 however, spe-
cifically sought to remove that limitation and have confusion en-
compass non-purchasers.198  In contrast, under the limited view of 
trademark protection, the focuses is on the purchaser, hence practi-
tioners should pay particular attention to an opinion’s focus on the 
purchaser. 
Apparently, some courts fail to examine the plain language of 
the statute, fail to examine the legislative history to determine the 
scope and content of the words of the statute,199 and fail to exam-
ine the legislative history to understand the policy and purpose of 
the statute.200  The consequence of those failures is the application 
 
196. See Marathon Mfg. Co. v. Enerlite Prods. Corp., 767 F.2d 214, 221, 226 
U.S.P.Q. 836 (5th Cir. 1985); Syntex Labs, Inc. v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 315 F. Supp. 
45, 49-53, 166 U.S.P.Q. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 437 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971); Rolex 
Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Canner, 645 F. Supp. 484, 1 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1117 (S.D. Fla. 1986); 
United States v. Hon, 14 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1959 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Yamin, 868 
F.2d 130, 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41, 2 
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1536 (8th Cir. 1987); T & T Mfg. Co. v. A.T. Cross, Inc., 197 U.S.P.Q. 763 
(D.R.I. 1978); Ferrari, S.P.A. v. McBurnie, 11 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1843 (S.D. Cal. 1989); Red-
ken Labs, Inc. v. Clairol, Inc., 175 U.S.P.Q. 737 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (rejecting expansive 
view). 
197. Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. (76 Stat. 773) 
896.  The 1962 Amendment deleted the word “purchasers” from section 2(d) of the Lan-
ham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d), which now reads “to cause confusion or mistake or to de-
ceive.”  Id. 
198. Id.  The legislative history contained the following rationale for the 1962 
Amendment: 
The bill proposes to revive the quoted expression to read “to cause confusion, 
or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”  The purpose of the proposed change is to 
coordinate the language here with that used elsewhere and to omit the word 
“purchasers.”  Since the provision actually relates to potential purchasers as 
well as to actual purchasers.  The word purchasers is eliminated as to avoid the 
possibility of misconstruction of the present language of the statute. 
Id. 
199. See Norfolk W.R. Co. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 128 
(1991); Negonsett v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99 (1993); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894, 
(1992); FDIC v. McSweeny, 976 F.2d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 1992); Ward v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
45 F.3d 353, 354 (10th Cir. 1994); DeOsorio v. United States INS, 10 F.3d 1034, 1043 
(4th Cir. 1993); Mitson v. AG Eng’g & Dev. Co., 835 F. Supp. 572, 574 (D. Col. 1993). 
200. See Dickerson v. New Banner, 460 U.S. 103, 110 (1983); Crandon v. United 
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of a legal doctrine that has been changed.  As Justice Holmes 
stated, it is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than 
that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.201  It is even more 
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have long 
since vanished, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of 
the past.202 
After recognizing that non-purchaser confusion is relevant, 
identification of these non-purchasers is a troublesome task—
especially in light of the fact that failure to accurately determine 
the proper universe of consumers can be fatal to the plaintiff’s 
case.  Nonetheless, compartmentalizing cases that identify differ-
ent universes can help develop a cogent theory as to whose confu-
sion is relevant.  This Part identifies various categories of non-
purchasers who could be confused. 
A. Users of the Goods or Services 
Purchasers of the goods or services are most often those who 
are confused; but not always.  Non-purchaser confusion is also 
relevant.  One group of non-purchasers is the user of the underly-
ing product.  In Educational Testing Service v. Touchstone Applied 
Science Associates, Inc.,203 the plaintiff marketed a computer based 
reading program trademarked “BOOKWHIZ.”204  The defendant 
marketed two whole language programs called “BROWSER” and 
“BOOKWIZE.”205  The court concluded that although the purchas-
ers of the two products were schoolteachers, administrators, and 
the similarly sophisticated purchasers,206 it was the ultimate con-
sumers, namely the school children, who might be confused be-
cause they lacked the sophistication to differentiate among the 
 
States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Shoonejengen, 514 U.S. 73 (1995); 
Tataronowiscz v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 268, 276 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Reese v. United States, 
24 F.3d 228, 231 (Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Vincent Tassinari, Patent Compensation Un-
der 35 U.S.C. § 284, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 59 (1998). 
201. O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
202. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 198, 299 (1986). 
203. 16 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1865 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
204. Id. at 1865. 
205. See id. 
206. Id. at 1869. 
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products.207 
In In re Artic Electronics Co.,208 there was a dispute involving 
use of the trademark “Mars” for an arcade game and for a bill-and-
coin change machine.209  The court held that although the arcade 
owner made the purchase, the game player was the ultimate user210 
who would, perhaps, be unaware of the differences, hence con-
fused.211  For example, if the change machine malfunctioned and 
the person wrongly attributed the faultiness to the video game 
manufacturer because of source confusion.212 
Ultimate users who do not necessarily make the initial order for 
the goods also me be confused.  In Artus Corp. v. Nordic Co.,213 a 
case involving color-coded shims to maintain spacing between 
milling machinery parts, a sales representative made the initial 
purchase by mail order.214  According to the court, the end user 
could still become confused after receiving a product in the mail 
and removing all point of sale disclaimers.215 
In Health Net v. USA Healthnet, Inc.,216 the court broadly ex-
panded the universe of relevant consumers to include subscribers, 
doctors, hospitals, and not just direct consumers.217  The plaintiff 
Health Net owned a service mark for “Health Net” as a health 
maintenance organization (“HMO”) and as a preferred provider 
organization (“PPO”).218  The defendant USA Healthnet, Inc. 
(“USA Healthnet”) called for a narrow universe consisting of so-
phisticated insurance companies and major corporate benefits 
managers.219  The plaintiff argued, on the other hand, that the uni-
verse included not only employer groups, subscribers, and mem-
 
207. Id. 
208. 220 U.S.P.Q. 836 (T.T.A.B. 1983). 
209. Id. at 837 
210. Id. 
211. See id. at 838 
212. See id. 
213. 213 U.S.P.Q. 568 (W.D. Pa. 1981). 
214. Id. at 570. 
215. Id. at 574. 
216. 26 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 1993). 
217. Id. at 1189. 
218. See id. at 1188. 
219. See id. at 1189. 
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bers, but also physicians, hospitals, and other providers of medical 
care.220  The court analyzed the sophistication of the consumers 
and determined that, despite the sophistication of the large corpo-
rate entities, the employees of the entities were not sophisti-
cated.221  The court found that it would be easy for those employ-
ees to think that the defendant’s PPO or HMO was associated with 
the plaintiff’s services.222  In this case, the court parsed the sophis-
tication of the consumers into its constituents and found a likeli-
hood of confusion at the constituent level. 
A particularly troublesome area of trademark law concerns the 
resale of salvaged goods.  For example, a salvage market occurs 
when goods are damaged during transit, storage, fire, or flood, and 
are subsequently resold at a reduced price.  Often, however, the ul-
timate user is not aware that the goods were part of the damaged 
lot.  In the event that the ultimate user complains of deficient or 
slightly damaged goods, the complaint would most likely be tar-
geted at the manufacturer or the primary source of the goods.  In 
the absence of complaints, the source of the product does not learn 
that users are developing unfavorable opinions of the product. 
The salvaged goods problem appeared in Pioneer Liemel Fab-
rics, Inc. v. Paul Rothman Industries, Ltd.223  In Pioneer Liemel, 
the plaintiff sold its fire damaged products to a middleman who, in 
violation of the original plaintiff-jobber contract, later resold the 
products to a retailer.224  The retailer sold the products to the actual 
users, who ultimately complained of defects.225  The court noted 
that because the plaintiff sold only high quality goods and did not 
engage in the second-hand market of its products, users expected 
to receive high quality goods.226  The court found without doubt 
that, as some users received damaged goods of inferior or ques-
tionable quality, the plaintiff lost future sales and suffered damage 
 
220. See id. 
221. Id. at 1190. 
222. Id. 
223. 25 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1096 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 
224. Id. at 1097-98. 
225. See id. at 1099-1100. 
226. Id. at 1104. 
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to its goodwill.227 
B. Lenders, Lessors, and Investors 
Within the category of non-purchasers whose confusion is 
relevant, there is another group of consumers who may not even 
see the product, but who may rely on their own memories as to the 
mark.  In Rockland Mortgage Corp. v. Shareholders Funding,228 
the court ruled that in classifying a mark, the impact of the mark 
and not the meaning of the term is important.229  There were two 
classes of buyers in Rockland Mortgage:  ordinary consumers gen-
erally seeking to refinance their mortgages, and professional con-
sumers, such as realtors, generally seeking to obtain mortgages on 
behalf of new and existing home buyers.230  When the class of buy-
ers is mixed, the likelihood of confusion is measured against the 
least sophisticated consumer.231  This means that a likelihood of 
confusion can be found even if professional buyers may not be 
confused.  The potential for duping investors or middlemen may 
still exist. 
Consistent with the theme of duping the investor, in Dynamet 
Technology, Inc. v. Dynamet, Inc.,232 the plaintiff engaged in the 
research and development of a prototype of titanium products.233  
The plaintiff used “Dynamet” in the securities prospectus that it 
mailed to potential investors.234  The defendant sold titanium rod 
and wire and also used “Dynamet” in prospective mailings to po-
tential investors, especially in the aircraft fastener industry.235  The 
TTAB determined that both companies openly and notoriously 
used the “Dynamet” name.236  The TTAB ruled in favor of the de-
fendant based on its superior use of the mark.237  According to the 
 
227. Id. 
228. 835 F. Supp. 182, 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1270 (D. Del. 1993). 
229. Id. at 1274. 
230. See id. at 1276. 
231. See id. at 1277. 
232. 593 F.2d 1007 (C.C.P.A. 1979). 
233. Id. at 1008. 
234. See id. at 1009. 
235. See id. 
236. 197 U.S.P.Q. 702 (T.T.A.B. 1977). 
237. Id. at 712. 
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court, the commitments from investors and financial support indi-
cated that goodwill accumulated in the mark.238  In this case, the 
defendant was able to prove prior rights in the mark based on the 
expanded universe that included potential investors. 
In Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co.,239 the district court 
identified many different consuming groups as part of the relevant 
universe of consumers likely to be confused.240  In that case, plain-
tiff Exxon Corp. (“Exxon”) was the successor in interest to the 
merger of Standard Oil Company and Humble Oil and Refining 
Company (“Humble Oil”).241  Exxon continued using the Humble 
Oil trademark, albeit in sparing fashion.242  Exxon is a well-known 
full-service oil and gas supplier, refiner, and explorer.243  The de-
fendant, Humble Exploration Co. (“Humble Exploration”), started 
as a company that made oil and gas exploration investments for 
friends and clients of the company’s founders.244  Later, Humble 
Exploration actively explored for gas and oil on its own, but gener-
ally limited its activities to a five county area in southeast Texas.245  
When defendant used the name “HUMBLE” as its trade name, 
Exxon sued.246 
In analyzing the likelihood of confusion, the Exxon court rec-
ognized that several groups of consumers were involved, including 
as common purchasers, suppliers, investors, lessees, and landown-
ers.247  The court implicitly accepted as evidence of actual confu-
sion the fact that lessors and investors in defendant’s oil explora-
tion services often asked whether the defendant was connected 
with the plaintiff.248  The court recognized that, because the defen-
dant used the name of the well-established plaintiff Exxon, the 
 
238. Id. 
239. 214 U.S.P.Q. 451 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 217 U.S.P.Q. 
1200 (5th Cir. 1983). 
240. Id. at 463. 
241. See id. at 455. 
242. See id. 
243. See id. at 455-56. 
244. See id. at 456. 
245. See id. 
246. See id. 
247. Id. at 461. 
248. Id. at 462. 
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probability existed that potential lessors or investors might engage 
in business with the defendant under the false impression that the 
defendant was affiliated with the plaintiff.  The salient point is that 
the purchasers of the defendant’s products were oil retailers, such 
as gas stations, yet the confused consumer universe included land-
owners or investors who were not in the market for defendant’s 
services.  The Fifth Circuit found no error in using such a broad 
universe.249 
C. Distributors, Suppliers, Wholesalers, and Retailers 
Distributors, suppliers, wholesalers, and retailers comprise an-
other category of non-purchasers whose confusion is relevant to 
trademark infringement.  In Lon Tai Shing Co. v. Koch & Lowy,250 
a typical trade dress case, the plaintiff manufactured lamps and 
sued under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, claiming that its 
lamps did not infringe upon the trade dress of the defendant’s 
“DOVE” brand lamps.251  The lamp was not inherently distinctive, 
thus, under a trade dress infringement analysis, the defendant 
needed to demonstrate distinctiveness252 by showing secondary 
meaning.253  To prove secondary meaning, the court determined 
the universe of consumers to be “persons interested in home and 
office designs, including architects, designers, decorators, and up-
scale sophisticated consumers.”254  The court noted that, although 
these people may be purchasers, they also influence the home or 
office owners to purchase the lamps.255  In Lon Tai Shing, retailers 
and wholesalers imported the lamps for distribution to designers, 
other distributors, and, in rare circumstances, to end consumers.256 
After finding secondary meaning in the lamps, the inquiry fo-
cused on the likelihood of confusion.  The court expanded the uni-
 
249. Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 217 U.S.P.Q. 1200, 1201 n.1 (5th 
Cir. 1983). 
250. 19 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
251. Id. 
252. The defendant in a declaratory judgment action is the putative mark holder. 
253. See id. at 1087. 
254. Id. (citing PAF S.R.L. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F. Supp. 394, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989)). 
255. Id. at 1088. 
256. Id. 
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verse of consumers to include not only potential consumers, but 
also wholesalers and retailers.257  In the trademark survey proffered 
by the plaintiff, the survey expert had posed as a shopper under the 
pretext of wanting to purchase the lamp or purporting to purchase 
the lamp on someone else’s behalf.258  In response, the defendant 
attacked the survey methodology.  The defendant criticized the 
choice of suburban areas as survey locations;259 the defendant 
criticized the failure to include discount stores in the survey inter-
cept,260 and the defendant asserted that survey respondents were 
salespeople who tended to push their own products on purchas-
ers.261  In dismissing those arguments, the court found that the sur-
vey response of eighteen percent was adequate to prove confu-
sion.262  The court also noted that where the universe of consumers 
is sophisticated—as it was with the sophisticated interior designers 
in Lon Tai Shing—a smaller universe is allowed and a smaller per-
centage of actual confusion need be shown.263  Therefore, practi-
tioners should expand the universe of their surveys to encompass 
sophisticated consumers whenever possible, so that scant incidence 
of actual confusion will tip the balance in favor of the survey pro-
ponent. 
In Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House,264 where the issue 
was the trade dress of dictionary dust jackets,265 Merriam-
Webster’s only evidence of actual confusion was the testimony of 
several of its own salesmen, the testimony of one person who was 
giving the dictionary away, the testimony of another who read a 
review in a magazine, and photographs of Merriam-Webster and 
Random House dictionaries shelved side-by-side at bookstores.266  
There was no testimony by any retail or wholesale consumer who 
 
257. Id. at 1090; see also Russ Berrie & Co. v. Jerry Elsner Co., 482 F. Supp. 980, 
205 U.S.P.Q. 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
258. See Lon Tai Shing, 19 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1093. 
259. See id. at 1096. 
260. See id. at 1095-96. 
261. See id. at 1096-97. 
262. Id. at 1097. 
263. Id. at 1097-98. 
264. 32 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1994). 
265. Id. at 1011. 
266. See id. at 1015. 
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intended to buy a Merriam-Webster dictionary, but mistakenly 
bought a Random House dictionary because of confusion between 
the trade dresses.267  The court found that the lack of survey evi-
dence counted against finding actual confusion.268  Thus, the court 
concluded that Merriam-Webster failed to show actual confusion 
affecting purchasers.269 
In discussing the sophistication of the relevant consumer 
group, the Merriam-Webster court stated that one must look to 
“[t]he general impression of the ordinary purchaser, buying under 
the normally prevalent conditions of the market and giving the at-
tention such purchasers usually give in buying that class of 
goods.”270  The court also noted that analysis of the sophistication 
factor involved individuals who are likely to purchase the prod-
uct.271  In this case, there were two pertinent classes of potential 
consumers, retail booksellers and individuals.272 
Generally, the retail booksellers were assumed to be sophisti-
cated buyers.273  Moreover, to order the dictionaries, the retail 
bookseller had to contact the particular publisher, and thus, it was 
virtually inconceivable that a bookseller would call Random House 
believing it was Merriam-Webster.274  Again, Merriam-Webster’s 
claim is implicitly based on an unstated assumption of its virtual 
anonymity as a dictionary publisher; that is, the consumer would 
not be able to distinguish the source of the dictionaries.275 
With regard to individual purchasers, the dictionaries were sold 
at retail for approximately twenty dollars and designed for several 
years of use.276  Moreover, individual purchasers of dictionaries 
 
267. See id. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. (citing McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1137 (2d 
Cir. 1979). 
271. Id. 
272. See id. 
273. See W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 576, 25 
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1593 (2d Cir. 1993). 
274. See Merriam-Webster, 32 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1015. 
275. See id. 
276. See id. 
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are generally literate.277  Therefore, designing the survey for the 
mark owner in this case required a dual universe model that identi-
fied both retailers and individual users.278 
Another query regards the results of a survey of wholesalers or 
retailers that also includes ultimate end-users.  In Essie Cosmetics, 
Ltd. v. Dae Do International, Ltd.,279 the trade dress of nail polish 
bottles and labeling were at issue.280  The plaintiff sold the bottles 
to nail salons and beauty supply houses.281  The plaintiff inter-
viewed survey respondents at various nail beauty trade shows and 
tallied over a seventy-five percent positive response rate.282  The 
court ruled that this response rate was more than adequate to dem-
onstrate secondary meaning among the wholesalers and retailers.283  
Furthermore, implicit in the decision, the court also noted that the 
relevant universe of survey respondents included the ultimate end-
user, that is, the consumer who walks into the salons and requests a 
nail polish service.284  Thus, in Essie Cosmetics case, the survey, 
which included ultimate end-users who increased the positive re-
sponse rate, assisted in proving that the nail polish bottle trade 
dress had acquired secondary meaning. 
D. Observers 
Observers or passersby comprise another group of non-
purchasers whose confusion is relevant to trademark infringement 
claims.285  In Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc.,286 the defendant 
manufactured knit shirts bearing a breast pocket emblem that was 
substantially similar to the famous polo player horseman symbol 
 
277. See id. 
278. See id. 
279. 25 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1849 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
280. Id. at 1850. 
281. See id. 
282. See id. at 1850-51. 
283. Id. at 1854. 
284. Id. 
285. See Insty Bit v. Poly-Tech Indus., 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1961, 1967 (8th Cir.) (“[A]n 
action for trademark infringement may be based on consumer confusion of consumers 
other than direct purchasers, including observers of an allegedly infringing product in use 
by a direct purchaser.”), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 1085 (1997). 
286. 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1444 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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used by Polo Fashions, Inc. (“Polo”).287  The defendant argued that 
any similarity between the emblems would not confuse a consumer 
because the shirt tag clearly indicated that the shirt was not an au-
thentic Ralph Lauren Polo shirt.288  Although such a point of pur-
chase disclaimer might suffice to dispel any point of purchase con-
fusion in certain circumstances, the court expanded the universe of 
people whose confusion is relevant to include observers.289  The 
court noted that in the post-purchase context, an observer or pas-
serby would not be able to see the shirt tag, and hence the source 
indication disclaimer would not dispel their confusion.290  On see-
ing the polo player symbol, it was likely that the observer or pas-
serby would identify the shirt with the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s 
reputation would suffer damage if the shirt appeared to be of poor 
quality.291  Therefore, in a trademark survey, the universe of rele-
vant consumers, apparently at least in the clothing line, would in-
clude general observers or passersby. 
The same situation occurred in Lois Sportwear, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Levi Strauss & Co.,292 wherein Lois Sportwear, U.S.A., Inc. (“Lois 
Sportwear”) produced jeans with a back pocket stitch design that 
was strikingly similar to that used by Levi Strauss & Co. (“Levi 
Strauss”).293  Interestingly enough, Lois Sportwear’s product qual-
ity was not inferior to Levi Strauss’s product quality.294  In addi-
tion, Lois Sportwear sold its high-quality jeans in both upscale 
stores and cut-rate discount stores.295  The appellate court noted 
that confusion could exist in the observers and passersby.296  This 
confusion, according to the court, likely existed when observers 
saw the stitching patterns on the Lois Sportwear jeans, believed 
that Levi Strauss had finally entered the upscale jeans market, and 
thus, wrongly believed that the upscale quality jeans were endorsed 
 
287. Id. at 1445. 
288. See id. at 1446. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. See id. 
292. 799 F.2d 867, 230 U.S.P.Q. 831 (2d Cir. 1986). 
293. Id. at 868. 
294. See id. at 875. 
295. See id. at 870. 
296. Id. at 872-73. 
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or affiliated with Levi Strauss.297  In arguing that the consumers 
were sophisticated, the court recognized that, despite any consumer 
sophistication in recognizing marks, in the post-purchase context, a 
sophisticated passerby would in fact be confused by Lois Sport-
wear’s stitching pattern.298  Therefore, in designing a survey for an 
item of clothing, the universe of consumers should include dis-
count shoppers, sophisticated consumers, and general clothing 
shoppers. 
The Federal Circuit recently addressed observer confusion in 
the post-sale context in Payless Shoesource Inc. v. Reebok Interna-
tional, Ltd.299  In that case, the appeals court held that the trial 
court had engaged in an incomplete analysis by failing to examine 
the existence of post-sale confusion among observers.300  More-
over, the Federal Circuit agreed with Reebok International’s 
(“Reebok”) argument that confusion could occur in post-sale ob-
servers, who see Payless Shoesource’s (“Payless”) shoes on the 
street and think they closely resemble those of Reebok.301  Those 
passersby would likely note the inferior quality and falsely attrib-
ute it to Reebok, thereby causing damage to Reebok’s reputa-
tion.302  The inclusion of observers is important because it provides 
a larger universe from which to generate evidence of secondary 
meaning or actual confusion.  It is noteworthy, however, the ordi-
nary observer is not automatically a valid respondent because a re-
spondent must be a potential consumer of the product in ques-
 
297. Id. at 875. 
298. Id. at 875-76. 
299. 27 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1516 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  The Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals regarding patent infringement and over 
decisions on appeal from the Patent and Trademark Office.  Normally, trademark deci-
sions by the Federal Circuit are by virtue of appeal from the Trademark Office.  In Pay-
less Shoesource, the Federal Circuit had jurisdiction over the case due to design patent 
infringement with a supplementary claim for trademark infringement.  In cases where the 
Federal Circuit is not vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction, the Federal Circuit will 
use the law of the sister circuit of the district court sits where the case originated.  See 
U.S. Philips Corp. v. Windmere Corp., 861 F.2d 695, 702, 8 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1885, 1890 
(Fed. Cir. 1988). 
300. Payless Shoesource, 27 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1519. 
301. Id. 
302. See id. 
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tion.303  Therefore, preliminary screening of observers must neces-
sarily include a question geared to whether the observer is also a 
potential consumer of the product. 
Finally, the sophistication of the direct purchaser is not relevant 
when examining the observer in the post-sale confusion context.  
That is so because, in examining post-sale confusion of an ob-
server, the sophistication of the direct purchaser can not obviate or 
vitiate observer confusion, as no relationship exists between the 
parties, except for the observer’s visual experience.  Such a situa-
tion presented itself in T. Anthony Ltd. v. Malletier,304 which con-
cerned the monogramming of luggage.305  The court, in adopting 
post-sale confusion of observers, noted that the sophistication of 
the buyer is not relevant in this situation.306  The court did not ac-
cept the defendant’s argument that sophistication of the buyer dis-
pelled any observer confusion.307 
IV. EVIDENTIARY EFFECT OF AN IMPROPER SURVEY UNIVERSE 
It can be difficult to identify the relevant universe of consumers 
whose confusion must be proved in a trademark infringement case.  
Like any other evidence in litigation, the ultimate determination as 
to whether the universe is proper and useable will occur only at 
trial.  In the event that the universe is improper, it is important to 
understand whether the survey has any utility at trial.  Although a 
faulty survey could be categorically excluded as non-probative and 
prejudicial if admitted, it also could be admitted as relevant but not 
dispositive evidence. 
A. Cases Excluding a Defective Universe Survey 
There are several cases in which a proffered survey proffered 
was given no weight.308  For example, in Spraying Systems Co. v. 
 
303. See Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co., 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1865, 1875 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) 
(“[T]o be probative and meaningful, surveys must rely upon responses by potential cus-
tomers of the products in question.”). 
304. 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
305. Id. at 1215. 
306. Id. at 1216. 
307. Id. at 1218. 
308. See, e.g., Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1181 (7th Cir. 
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Delavan, Inc.,309 the case concerned whether the plaintiff’s mark 
had achieved protection by virtue of having attained secondary 
meaning.310  The plaintiff offered three surveys to demonstrate the 
secondary meaning of the mark.311  The Seventh Circuit criticized 
the universe because it included only the ultimate purchasers, 
namely farmers, of the spray jets, when a significant number of 
spray jets had been sold to distributors and equipment manufactur-
ers.312  Thus, the universe of farmers was under-inclusive and viti-
ated any value of the survey.313 
In Jordache Enterprises v. Levi Strauss & Co.,314 the case con-
cerned the use of “Jordache Basics 101” and Levi Strauss’s mark 
“501” for jeans.315  The district court criticized Levi Strauss’s sur-
vey evidence as having a defective universe and found that the 
survey was inconclusive.316  The court noted that the survey was 
irrelevant because it polled only respondents who had worn or pur-
chased jeans in the last six months.317  As a result, the universe did 
not include potential purchasers of jeans.318  The court also reaf-
firmed that a survey must rely on responses by potential customers 
of the products in question.319 
An under-inclusive universe, which excludes one or more rele-
vant groups, is ground for rejecting a survey.320  This situation oc-
curred in American Basketball Ass’n v. AMF Voit, Inc.,321 which 
 
1992) (ruling that a survey had no evidentiary value); Jordache Enters. v. Levi Strauss & 
Co., 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1721 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (same); American Basketball Ass’n v. AMF 
Voit, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 981, 177 U.S.P.Q. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (same), aff’d, 487 F.2d 
1393, 180 U.S.P.Q. 290 (2d Cir. 1973). 
309. 24 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1181 (7th Cir. 1992). 
310. Id. 
311. See id. at 1186. 
312. Id. 
313. See id. at 1187 n.5. 
314. 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1721 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
315. Id. at 1722. 
316. Id. at 1729. 
317. Id. at 1729. 
318. See id. at 1729-30. 
319. Id. at 1729. 
320. See American Basketball Ass’n v. AMF Voit, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 981, 177 
U.S.P.Q. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 487 F.2d 1393, 180 U.S.P.Q. 290 (2d Cir. 1973). 
321. 358 F. Supp. 981, 177 U.S.P.Q. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff’d, 487 F.2d 1393, 
180 U.S.P.Q. 290 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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concerned the red, blue, and white color of basketballs.322  The 
plaintiff surveyed males between ages twelve and twenty-three 
who played basketball within the last year.323  The court criticized 
this universe as being too narrow because it did not encompass all 
people who were in the market to buy basketballs.324 
B. Cases Giving Some Weight to a Defective Universe Survey 
A number of cases demonstrate that a survey with a defective 
universe is entitled to some evidentiary weight.  In McDonald’s 
Corp. v. McBagel’s Inc.,325 the universe of consumers was slightly 
flawed but did not render the survey useless.326  McDonald’s, the 
well-known fast food giant sued a New York-based bagel bakery 
and restaurant,327 which objected to a survey whose universe in-
cluded 504 randomly selected people nationwide and 500 ran-
domly selected persons within New York State.328  The court re-
jected the defendant’s argument that the survey universe was too 
broad, noting that the broad universe was controlled by asking re-
spondents whether they had eaten in a fast food restaurant re-
 
322. Id. 
323. See id. at 986. 
324. Id. at 446.  Survey evidence is often criticized for being too narrow.  See, e.g., 
American Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1058, 3 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1194, 
1204 (D.N.J. 1987) (noting that the universe of Advil-tablet users was too narrow), aff’d, 
834 F.2d 368 (3rd Cir. 1987); Brooks Shoe Mfg. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 533 F. Supp. 75, 
215 U.S.P.Q. 358, 363 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (noting that the universe of serious runners 
skewed results because it should have included runners purchasing expensive and inex-
pensive shoes), aff’d, 716 F.2d 854 (11th Cir. 1983); Ferrari, S.P.A. v. McBurnie, 11 
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1843 (S.D. Cal. 1989) (affording some weight to a survey based on a narrow 
universe); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Comstock Partners, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1029, 17 U.S.P.Q. 
2d 1599, 1603 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (criticizing an universe that only sampled investors or 
registered representatives and failed to include people who would actually avail them-
selves of the defendant’s products); Universal Frozen Foods Co. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 
697 F. Supp. 389, 394, 7 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1856, 1860 (D. Or. 1987) (finding that an universe 
of thirty distributors was too narrow because it excluded restaurant operators who served 
curly fries); Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 615, 12 U.S.P.Q. 2d 
1740, 1744 (9th Cir. 1989) (criticizing an universe because it had narrow age restric-
tions). 
325. 1 U.P.S.Q. 2d 1761 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
326. Id. at 1768. 
327. Id. at 1761. 
328. See id. at 1768. 
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cently.329  The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that the 
universe was too broad because it may have included respondents 
who had worked for the plaintiff.330  Despite any shortcomings in 
the universe identified, the survey was still entitled to some proba-
tive value. 
In Insty Bit v. Poly-Tech Industries,331 the Eighth Circuit re-
versed the district court’s decision not to grant any weight to a sur-
vey, ruling ruled that although the universe was small, the survey 
respondents’ answers created genuine facts for trial.332  The Eighth 
Circuit did not adopt a theory that small universes are per se al-
lowable; but rather, in this context, merely ruled that a survey with 
small universe can demonstrate sufficient issues of material fact to 
avoid summary judgment.333 
In limiting its ruling to the summary judgment issue, the Eighth 
Circuit cited the survey for methodological errors, wherein the sur-
vey expert did not narrow the universe by asking respondents 
whether they intended to buy the products in the future.334  The rul-
ing seemed to indicate that the universe should be narrowed to in-
clude those people who manifest an intent to buy the underlying 
product in the future, and it raised the prospect of exclusion of the 
survey at trial. 
Similarly, in Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca,335 a district 
court held the universe of consumers to be too broad, but nonethe-
less held the survey to be probative.  The plaintiff proffered two 
surveys on the issue of likelihood of confusion between its mark 
“DOM PERIGNON,” the celebrated champagne, and the mark 
“DOM POPIGNON,” the defendant’s gourmet popcorn.336  The 
first survey used a universe that included respondents who shopped 
in gourmet stores, were between twenty-five and sixty-four years 
old, did not work in liquor stores, and did not restrict themselves to 
 
329. Id. 
330. Id. 
331. 95 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 1085 (1997). 
332. Id. at 672. 
333. See id. 
334. Insty-Bit, 39 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1966-67. 
335. 31 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1865 (S.D.N.Y. 1994). 
336. Id. at 1866-67. 
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champagne or wine drinkers.337  The second survey proffered by 
the plaintiff expanded the universe to include general retail stores, 
persons of legal drinking age—twenty-one—and male and female 
respondents in proportion to their existence in the surrounding 
community.338  The court criticized the universe as being over-
inclusive because it included all persons of legal drinking age.339  
The court held to the general rule that, to be probative, the universe 
must include respondents who are potential customers of the prod-
ucts.  The court criticized the survey for including respondents 
merely because they were legally allowed purchase liquor.340  The 
court noted that the better definition of universe would include 
groups of consumers who were in the market for champagne or, 
better yet, “DOM PERIGNON.”341  Nevertheless, the court did not 
categorically reject the survey; it afforded it some probative 
weight.342 
In Weight Watchers, International, Inc. v. Stouffer Corp.,343 a 
case wherein both plaintiff and defendant introduced surveys, the 
court stated that both survey universes were flawed but gave some 
weight to plaintiff’s survey and rejected the defendant’s survey.  
The court criticized the plaintiff’s survey as being too broad be-
cause it was based on women, between eighteen and fifty-five 
years old, who had purchased frozen food entrees in the past six 
months, and who had attempted to lose weight through diet or ex-
ercise during the previous year.344  The court declared that the uni-
verse should have been limited to those persons who had pur-
chased diet frozen entrees or who had tried to lose weight through 
diet alone—not through exercise.345  Nevertheless, the court gave 
the plaintiff’s survey some weight.346 
The defendant’s survey, however, was accorded no weight.  
 
337. See id. at 1869. 
338. See id. at 1870-71. 
339. Id. at 1875. 
340. See id. 
341. Id. 
342. Id. 
343. 19 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1321 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
344. Id. at 1331. 
345. Id. 
346. Id. at 1330. 
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Like the plaintiff’s survey. The defendant’s survey was criticized 
for failing to reference those losing weight by diet or those in the 
market for frozen diet foods.347  The defendant’s universe included 
males and females, between eighteen and fifty-five years of age, 
who ate any frozen meal in the last six months or helped select fro-
zen meals for the household.348  The court found that the errors in 
the universe—when coupled with additional flaws in design and 
interpretation of the survey—so undermined its probative value 
that it deserved no evidentiary weight.349 
C. Reconciling an Improper Universe As Too Broad Or Too 
Narrow 
In reading the courts’ discussions regarding the effect of a too 
narrow or too broad universe, one trend appears to surface.  A 
court will give some weight to an survey universe that is too broad, 
but will not give any weight to a survey universe that is too nar-
row.  The reason may be that a broad universe is overinclusive, 
hence it necessarily encompasses the actual and correct universe.  
Consequently, the results of a survey based on an overbroad uni-
verse is still probative over how the underlying correct universe 
would respond to the questions.  Nonetheless, an overbroad survey 
usually is not dispositive to the question of actual confusion. 
Conversely, a survey based on too narrow an universe does not 
include even the minimum correct universe.  Thus, no matter how 
well the survey is conducted, it will exclude some relevant group 
of consumers and cannot be used to foretell how those consumers 
would respond to the survey questions.  Practitioners should ac-
cordingly err on the side of caution with an over-inclusive universe 
so that its results are probative. 
 
347. See id. 
348. See id. at 1332. 
349. See id. at 1333. 
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CONCLUSION 
By examining confusion in the context of how, when, and 
which consumers are confused, a survey proponent can maximize 
the value of a trademark survey.  Given that surveys are becoming 
increasingly important and probative to the underlying issues of 
secondary meaning, likelihood of confusion, dilution, and generi-
cide, a properly conducted trademark survey that examines the 
relevant universe of consumers is critical.  It is essential to analyze 
the propriety of a relevant universe because that universe will dic-
tate the outcome of the case. 
